

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09875 01 OF 02 091235Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----124633 091237Z /40

O R 091153Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9637
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 9875

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, US, XF
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH KUZNETSOV ON MIDDLE EAST

REFS: A. STATE 147102, B. STATE 155158, C. MOSCOW 9858

SUMMARY. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILS OF MY JULY 8 DISCUSSION WITH
KUZNETSOV ON MIDDLE EAST AS SUMMARIZED IN REF C. END SUMMARY.

1. IN THE ABSENCE OF GROMYKO WHO IS ON LEAVE, I MET WITH
ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV ON JULY 8 FOR 50 MINUTES'
DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCH
DISCUSSION AT THIS LEVEL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE
IN MOSCOW SUBSEQUENT TO THE AGREEMENT IN GENEVA IN MAY BY
SECRETARY VANCE AND GROMYKO THAT SUCH TALKS BE HELD REGULARLY
AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. ALSO PRESENT ON SOVIET SIDE
WERE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO, CHIEF OF
MFA'S NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT SYTENKO AND NOTE TAKER
V. K. FAKOV.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09875 01 OF 02 091235Z

2. KUZNETZOV OPENED BY NOTING THAT WE WERE MEETING
IN ACCORDANCE WITH HE VANCE-GROMYKO AGREEMENT IN
GENEVA WITH THE CONCRETE TASK OF WORKING TOWARDS THE
REOPENING OF THE GENEVA MEPC. EXTENDING HIS WELCOME,
HE INVITED REMARKS.

3. I RESPONDED BY MAKING THE POINTS SET FORTH IN REF A AS REVISED BY REF B ADDING MY PERSONAL OBSERVATION THAT IF YADIN ENTERED THE COALITION IT WOULD BE GOOD BECAUSE HE WAS MORE MODERATE THAN BEGIN AND WOULD EXERT A LEVELLING INFLUENCE. I CLOSED THIS PRESENTATION BY SAYING I WOULD BE HAPPY TO HEAR WHAT KUZNETZOV COULD TELL ME ABOUT THE FAHMI-GROMYKO TALKS.

4. IN RESPONSE KUZNETSOV SAID THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING PARTICULARLY NEW AND THAT OUR SIDE HAD BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THE FAHMI-GROMYKO TALKS. IN ALL THEIR BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE ARABA AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, THE SOVIETS HAD HELD TO THE LINE IN THE VANCE-GROMYKO COMMUNIQUE. NOW WAS THE TIME FOR "OUR MINISTERS" TO EXPAND THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD CONVENING THE MEPC THIS AUTUMN. THERE WAS NO NEED TO REPEAT WELL KNOWN SOVIET POSITIONS, BUT HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN VIEW OF COMPLEX PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS BOTH SIDES MUST INTENSIFY EFFORTS TOWARD MEPC. AS AN EXAMPLE OF RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS, FAHMI-GROMYKO TALKS INCLUDED NOT ONLY BILATERALS BUT EXCHANGE OF OPINION ON ME AND PUBLICATION OF DOCUMENT WHEREIN EGYPT SUPPORTS MEPC THIS AUTUMN.

5. THE IMMEDIATE BURNING ISSUES, SAID KUZNETSOV, WERE PARTICIPATION AT MEPC AND THE POSITION OF THE PLO, AND HE WOULD LIKE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09875 01 OF 02 091235Z

TO KNOW HOW THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION NOW APPROACHES THESE ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE PEVIOUS DAY BEGIN HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO AN MEPC IN OCTOBER BUT THEN DECLARED ISRAEL OPPOSED PARTICIPATION BY PLO REPRESENTATIVES. HOW LONG COULD ISRAEL NEGATE THE PLO AND WHAT WAS THE U.S. POSITION?

6. IN RESPONSE I SAID MY GOVERNMENT HELD THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD MAKE IT A BIT EASIER FOR US AND ISRAEL IF THE PLO WOULD ADHERE TO RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. OF COURSE, THE ISRAELIS GO EVEN FARTHER: THEY WANT THE PLO TO CHANGE ITS CHARTER SO AS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS NO LONGER COMMITTED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. AT THE RECENT PLO COUNCIL MEETING IN CAIRO THERE WAS NO PRONOUNCEMENT WHICH COULD ENCOURAGE US TO BELIEVE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A FUNCTIONAL SHIFT IN THE PLO POSITION. AS FOR MEPC'S PARTICIPATION, I SAID THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN PURSUING THIS POINT IF IN FACT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ATTEND BECAUSE OF PARTICIPATION BY A PLO DELEGATION. WE WERE, OF COURSE, AWARE OF VARIOUS FORMULAE DISCUSSED AMONG ARAB NATIONS, SOVIETS AND PLO, E.G. AS PART OF COMBINED ARAB DELEGATION OR PART OF JORDANIAN ELEGATION, BUT I DID NOT KNNOW WHETHER EEITHER OF THESE WOULD MEET ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS. THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT--AND THIS WAS A VERY

PRACTICAL QUESTION--WAS TO MOVE THE PLO TO A POSITION WHERE ISRAEL COULD CONSIDER PARTICIPATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MORE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE WITH PLO THAN OTHERS, I ASKED WHAT LINE THEY WERE TAKING WITH THE PLO RE 242, 338 AND RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL.

7. KUZNETSOV SAID RECOGNITION OR NON-RECOGNITION WAS ANOTHER QUESTION: THE PLO COMPLAINS THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT PLO RECOGNITION BUT WON'T EVEN SIT AT THE TABLE WITH THE PLO, LET ALONE RECOGNIZE IT. VIS A VIS THE PLO, KUZNETSOV SAID, THE U.S. SEEMS TO TAKE THE POSITION OF A DETACHED OBSERVER, MERELY PASSING BACK AND FORTH TO INTERESTED PARTIES EACH OTHERS' VIEWS. ALL THE ARABS WANT THE PLO TO PARTICIPATE AT THE MEPC AND SO DOES THE PLO. THE U.S. POSITION NEEDS TO BE STRONGER, ESPECIALLY IN DEALING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 09875 01 OF 02 091235Z

WITH ISRAEL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09875 02 OF 02 091314Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----124888 091319Z /47

O R 091153Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9638
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 9875

EXDIS

8. STRESSING THAT RECOGNITION OR NON-RECOGNITION WAS A POLITICAL QUESTION, KUZNETSOV RECALLED THAT NORTH VIETNAM ATTENDED THE 1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE EVEN THOUGH IT HAD NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

WITH SOME OTHER PARTICIPANTS (U.S., U.K.). HE ALSO MADE A PASSING REFERENCE TO THE 1948 MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE WHICH WORKED OUT A CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, FOR ISRAEL TO SAY THAT IT WON'T SIT AT THE TABLE WITH THE PLO IS TANTAMOUNT TO SAYING ISRAEL DOESN'T WANT AN MEPC, DOESN'T WANT A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

9. AT THIS POINT SYTENKO INTERVENED TO REFER TO MY REQUEST THAT THE SOVIETS USE THEIR INFLUENCE. HE REMINDED ME THAT WHEREAS THE ARAB STATES AND THE PLO HAD PREVIOUSLY OPPOSED AN MEPC, NOW THEY WERE READY (HIS CLEAR IMPLICATION BEING THAT THE SOVIETS DESERVED THE CREDIT). BUT NOW ISRAEL REFUSES. HOW COULD THERE BE AN MEPC WITHOUT THE PLO?

10. I REJOINED THAT AS LONG AS THE PLO IS ON RECORD--IN ITS CHARTER--AS AIMING AT DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL, THE ISRAELIS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09875 02 OF 02 091314Z

WOULD NOT EVEN TALK TO THE PLO LET ALONE SIT IN CONFERENCE WITH IT. REPEATING THAT THIS WAS A VERY PRACTICAL QUESTION I SAID WE COULD ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL BUT OUR INFLUENCE IS LESS THAN THE SOVIETS THINK, FOR ON THIS ISSUE THE ISRAELIS ARE ADAMANT.

11. KORIYENKO REMARKED THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAD THE RIGHT TO EXIST AS A STATE. AFTER ALL, THEY HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THEIR LANDS. NOW ON ONE HAD BEGIN SAYS HE SETS NO PRECONDITIONS. ON THE OTHER, HE SAYS ISRAEL WON'T SIT WITH THE PLO.

12. AFTER I REPEATED MY POINTS ON THIS SCORE, KUZNETSOV SAID THE SOVIET LINE WAS TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO GET ALL SIDES TO ATTEND MEPC. AS A RESULT, WHEREAS SYRIA HAD PREVIOUSLY REFUSED EVEN TO HEAR ABOUT AN MEPC NOW DAMASCUS ADVOCATES THAT IT BE CONVENED SOON. THE PLO HAD BEEN ADAMANTLY OPPOSED, AND IT WASN'T EASY TO PERSUADE THE PALESTINIANS- BUT NOW THEY WERE READY TO PARTICIPATE ON AN EQUAL LEVEL. IN SUM, THE ARABS HAD MOVED THREE-FOURTHS OF THE WAY TOWARDS MEETING THE ISRAELIS AT THE MEPC, BUT THE U.S. DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE PUSHED ISRAEL HARD. AS TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, THESE WILL BE SEEN AT THE CONFERENCE: "YOU AND WE WILL TRY TO GET THINGS RESOLVED", BUT TO DEMAND NOW THAT THE PLO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL WITHOUT RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION WAS AN "UNEQUAL APPROACH." OBJECTIVELY ANALYZING THE SITUATION, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONVENE THE MEPC AND TO RESOLVE THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS OF PARTICIPATION. THIS REQUIRES COMMON EFFORTS BY BOTH OF US, BUT THE U.S. DOESN'T PUSH HARD. THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND PLO HAVE MADE MANY STEPS FORWARD BUT NOT ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY NOT BEGIN.

13. I SAID I COULD AGREE THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME FORWARD ARAB MOVEMENT SINCE 1973 BUT THERE REMAINED A PRACTICAL QUESTION:

EVEN IF THE SOVIETS CAN'T GET THE PLO TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09875 02 OF 02 091314Z

LEAST THEY SHOULD PERSUADE THE PLO TO ADHERE TO 242 AND 338.
FRANKLY, I DID NOT THINK THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND ADQUATELY
THE DEPTH OF ISRAELI EMOTION. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SAID
THAT IF I WERE AN ISRAELI AND MY EXISTENCE WERE AT STAKE I
WOULD BE VERY TOUGH TOO. WITH THIS I SUGGESTED THAT WE
COME BACK TO THIS QUESTION AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

14. KUZNETSOV AGREED. REFERRING TO MY EARLIER PLEA FOR
MODERATION, HE CLAIMED THAT THE USSR HAD ALWAYS ADVOCATED
RESTRAINT AND HAD AVOIDED INFLAMMATORY ACTION OR STATEMENTS
ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE USSR CONTINUES THIS LINE "BUT WHEN
OTHERS TAKE SUCH ACTIONS WE MUST SPEAK OUT LOUD AND CLEAR
ALBEIT SOMETIMES BELATEDLY." CITING MY COMPLAINT ABOUT
PRAVDA LINE, HE SAID HE WOULD NOT GO INTO WHAT THE U.S. PRESS
PRINTS, BUT PRAVDA HAD NOT PRINTED ANYTHING WHICH WAS
INCORRECT. (NOTE: SINCE HE DID NOT ASK ME FOR FURTHER
EXAMPLES OF UNHELPFUL SOVIET COMMENTARY I DID NOT CITE ANY.)

15. REFERRING TO THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WHICH HAD
SUFFERED TWO YEARS OF DESTRUCTION AND SUFFERING, KUZNETSOV
SAID ALL SIDES SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO NORMALIZE AND RESTORE THE
COUNTRY. HE WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD ABIDE BY THIS.
BUT NOW ISRAEL WAS ENGAGING IN PROVOCATORY ATTACKS, RAIDS,
FLIGHTS, INTRUSIONS AND BURNING OF VILLAGES. SUCH ACTIONS
CONTRIBUTED TO TENSION NOT RELAXATION AND THEY DID NOT HELP
MOVEMENT TOWARD MEPC. THEREFORE, THE U.S. SHOULD PERSUADE
ISRAEL TO DESIST. DESPITE MY MODESTY RE U.S. INFLUENCE AND
POWER, ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE U.S. COULD DO SOMETHING:
"WE ARE ENTITLED TO RAISE THIS MATTER OF VITAL INTEREST."

16. I SAID THERE WAS LITTLE I COULD DISAGREE WITH IN TERMS OF OUR
CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON. BUT
THE SOVIETS SHOULD REALIZE FROM THE ISRAELI VIEWPOINT THIS WAS
WAS PART OF THEIR BORDER AND A TRADITIONAL ROUTE FOR TERRORISTS;
THEREFORE THE ISRAELIS WERE HYPERSENSITIVE. I NOTED THAT DURING
MY TENURE IN ISRAEL I HAD TRIED ON MANY OCCASIONS TO PERSUADE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 09875 02 OF 02 091314Z

RABIN OF THE NECESSITY FOR RESTRAINT IN THIS AREA AND I ASSURED
KUZNETSOV THAT WE WERE JUST AS CONCERNED AS THE SOVIETS IN TRYING
TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO AMELIORATE THE SITUATION. WITH THAT
KUZNETSOV AND I TURNED TO ANOTHER SUBJECT (SEPTTEL).

17. COMMENT: THE REMARKS OF KUZNETSOV AND OTHERS WERE PREDICTABLE.
THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BUSINESSLIKE AND NON-ACRIMONIOUS. KUZNETSOV
QUIETLY BUT EFFECTIVELY DOMINATED THE SOVIET SIDE AND AT ONE
POINT INTERVENED TO CUT OFF SYTENKO WHEN THE LATTER STARTED TO
REITERATE HIS LINE SOMEWHAT PETULANTLY. IT WAS, IN SUM,
A GOOD BEGINNING OF WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A CONTINUING DIALOGUE
AT HIGH LEVEL IN MOSCOW.
TOON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, PEACE TALKS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 09-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MOSCOW09875
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770244-0907
Format: TEL
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770774/aaaacmsr.tel
Line Count: 286
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 43918a6e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 STATE 147102, 77 STATE 155158, 77 MOSCOW 9858
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1913475
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONSULTATIONS WITH KUZNETSOV ON MIDDLE EAST
TAGS: PGOV, UR, US, XF, (TOON, MALCOLM), (KUZNETSOV)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/43918a6e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009